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ABSTRACT
This paper explores the theoretical implications
of a change in the behavioral assumptions of the
Lerner index in the case of U.S. credit unions
which do not operate under profit maximization.
Despite the finding that the Lerner index under-
estimates the actual degree of market power in
this non standard case, the value found for credit
unions is considerably higher than for commer-
cial banks. In other words, credit unions behave
relatively monopolistically.
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INTRODUCTION
The famous Lerner index, as formulated in A.P.
Lerner’s paper ’The Concept of Monopoly and the
Measurement of Monopoly Power’ (1934), has
been used extensively in the literature on monopo-
listic behavior and competition measures. Elzinga
and Mills (2011) carefully summarize the major
critics of the Lerner index such as the assumption
of constant returns to scale and homogeneous-
product markets. However, the existing literature
has not investigated the crucial assumption of
profit maximization which implicitly defines the
Lerner index. The way a ’monopolist’ and ’the
social optimum’ are defined by A.P. Lerner and
the assumption of profit maximizing behavior of
firms are crucial axioms determining the Lerner
index.
The Lerner index has been a popular measure in
the field of finance and banking in order to mea-
sure banking competition. However, this is done
primarily in the context of commercial banks. In
the context of credit unions concentration mea-
sures such as the Herfindahl index are used by
Emmons and Schmid (2000) or new theoretical
frameworks are developed in order to capture the
different behavioral characteristics such as in
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Smith, Cargill, and Meyer (1981).
Credit unions have a ’not-for-profit’ nature and
pursue quite different objectives compared to the
commercial banks’ aim of profit maximization.
Specifically, the main aims of credit unions as de-
scribed by Froman (1935) are encouraging thrift
and providing credit for productive purposes at a
reasonable cost for their members. In economic
terms, the main objective of credit unions could
be defined as maximizing revenues under a min-
imum profit constraint as some profit should be
made to maintain solvency.
The focus of this paper will be measuring the de-
gree of market power for credit unions by means
of the Lerner index. However, using the Lerner
index in the context of credit unions must be
considered as a special case due to the fact that
credit unions do not pursue profit maximization.
Therefore, this paper will explore the theoreti-
cal implications of this change in the behavioral
assumptions in order to find an answer to the
question whether the Lerner index as a measure
of competition between credit unions in the U.S.
is still suitable, when the assumption of profit
maximization is changed. Additionally, it will be
tested empirically whether the value of the Lerner
index for credit unions differs significantly from
the value for commercial banks.
CREDIT UNIONS
A credit union is a bank that typically can
be described as a not-for-profit, co-operative
and member-owned association, which provides
small, short-term loans and savings. Originally
its members are closely related in the sense that
they usually have some common associated in-
terest, e.g. the same employer, the same labor
union, church, county or state (Froman (1935)).
What do credit unions pursue? Clearly, not profit
maximization. Credit unions rather aim to serve
people in a community-oriented way in order to
create an environment in which one can safely
invest and obtain credit for productive purposes.
It is unlikely that there exists considerable com-
petition between credit unions. However, they do
operate in a competitive environment as Emmons
and Schmid (2000) found evidence that commer-
cial banks and credit unions directly affect each
other’s positions in local deposit markets. In this
paper it is assumed that the credit union operates
by means of revenue maximizing behavior under
a minimum profit constraint. Using this as the
behavioral assumption of credit unions will en-
able us to evaluate the Lerner index. Hereby, this
paper complements the existing literature on the
specification of the credit unions’ objective func-
tion, such as Murray and White (1980) who use
cost minimization subject to an output constraint
or Taylor (1971) who uses minimization of the
difference between loan and deposit interest rate.
THE LERNER INDEX
Lerner (1934) argues that the degree of monopoly
can be found in the economic and social impli-
cations of control over price and the degree of
the accompanying social loss. It is the level of
monopoly presence and the concomitant profit-
maximizing behavior that causes a deviation from
the social optimum and thereby causes social
welfare loss. Therefore, a suitable measure of
monopoly power should capture the degree of
divergence from the social optimum, which is
reached in the competitive equilibrium (p. 168).
The social optimum is reached if price is equal to
marginal cost (p. 165). From this the Lerner index
follows:
LI(q) =
P (q)− C ′(q)
P (q)
(1)
where P (q) is the profit-maximizing price and
C ′(q) represents the level of marginal costs (MC).
From the assumption that, generally, no negative
profits are made (or only incidentally), the Lerner
index is greater or equal to zero. A value of zero
corresponds to the equality of price and marginal
cost. This case represents ’perfect competition’, a
situation in which every firm has indefinite mar-
ket power and no influence on price. Since profit
maximization is assumed, the Lerner index is
smaller or equal to one. A value of one corre-
sponds to a perfectly monopolistic situation with
complete market power and full influence over
price. In the definition of the monopolistic be-
havior it is assumed that profit maximization is
always pursued. Furthermore, the core variable P
in (1) is the profit maximizing price, determined
by the intersection of MR = MC. From this, the
omnipresence of the profit-maximizing assump-
tion is clear. In equilibrium situations where the
MC-curve and the MR-curve intersect, the Lerner
index is equal to the absolute value of the inverse
of the price elasticity of demand.
THEORETICAL ANALYSIS
In this section, we begin to speculate what the
Lerner index will be in context of U.S. credit
unions and how its value might deviate from the
case of commercial banks where the standard be-
havioral assumption of profit - maximizing holds.
It is not expected that there is a change in the
boundaries of the Lerner index. Therefore, the
benchmark cases of the Lerner index are main-
tained and its the value for credit unions can be
compared directly to its value for commercial
banks. From this we might assume that the Lerner
index maintains its ability to measure the degree
of market power.
Presumptions
Presumably, the value of the Lerner index in the
context of credit unions is either higher or lower
than its value in the context of commercial banks.
This is because two lines of reasoning can be fol-
lowed. One which will lead to a relatively low
value of the Lerner index, i.e. considerably close
to zero, indicating a higher level of competition
between credit unions. The other line of rea-
soning will lead to a relatively high value of the
Lerner index, i.e. a value close to one, indicat-
ing a higher level of monopoly power of credit
unions. The value of the Lerner index is con-
sidered low (high) when it is significantly lower
(higher) than 0.2-0.3 as determined by Koetter,
Kolari, and Spierdijk (2012) which holds on aver-
age for U.S. commercial banks. Using this value
gives us some basis for comparing the resulting
value of the Lerner index when the behavioral as-
sumption is changed.
Formal theoretical analysis
In order to consider the Lerner index for credit
unions we have to explore to what extent there is
a deviation from the standard situation in which
the Lerner’s formula crucially depends on the as-
sumption of profit maximization. A deviation
from this situation is characterized by a new defi-
nition of the social optimum which is determined
by the new behavioral assumptions. Credit unions
are assumed to behave under revenue maximiza-
tion subject to a minimum profit constraint. From
Baumol and Bradford (1970), we see that the so-
cial optimum in this case is no longer determined
by marginal-cost pricing. Consider a firm (credit
union) that maximizes its revenues under a min-
imum profit constraint. Let P (q) be the inverse
demand function and C(q) the cost function. Let
the minimum profit be given by pio > 0. The fol-
lowing optimization problem is faced:
maxq≥0P (q)q (2)
s.t.P (q)q − C(q) ≥ pi0.
A unique optimal solution to this problem can
be found by using Kuhn-Tucker optimization.
Spierdijk and Zaouras (2014) found that, under
certain conditions, the optimal solution q˜ to this
optimization problem must satisfy q˜ > 0 and:
P ′(q˜)q˜ + P (q˜) =
µ
1 + µ
C ′(q˜) < C ′(q˜) (3)
where the Kuhn-Tucker multiplier µ > 0. It is
very hard or even impossible in this case to quan-
tify the value of the Kuhn-Tucker multipliers µ.
From this we observe that revenue maximization
under a minimum profit constraint yields a op-
timal output level q˜ > q∗ (the optimal profit-
maximizing output). Also, the corresponding
output price is lower than the profit-maximizing
price: P (q˜) < P (q∗). The new social opti-
mum under the different behavioral assumption
is given by the point where price is equal to
[µ/(1 + µ)] times marginal cost opposed to the
point where price is equal to marginal cost in the
profit-maximizing case.
Spierdijk and Zaouras (2014) conclude that the
original price-cost margin, the Lerner index un-
der profit-maximizing behavior, underestimates
the degree of market power when the firm under
study is characterized by revenue maximizing be-
havior under a minimum profit constraint. Hence,
measuring the degree of market power of credit
unions by means of the original Lerner index will
result in a lower degree of market power than
actually is the case. In conclusion, the accuracy
of the Lerner index as a measure of market power
is diminished in the absence of profit maximizing.
EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS
On the website of the National Credit Union Ad-
ministration (NCUA) the quarterly Call Report
data for over 7000 individual credit unions is
available for 1994 - 2014. Because of inconsisten-
cies in the dataset only the quarterly data of 2001-
2013 is used for this analysis, which accounts for
359,048 useful bank-quarter observations.
The determination of the Lerner index yields
two intermediate steps by means of which the
marginal cost element is estimated. Following
Koetter et al. (2012) and Shaffer and Spierdijk
(2013), we start by specifying a translog cost
function. Herewith, a three-input one-output
production technology is assumed following the
intermediation model for banks (Klein (1971),
Monti (1972), Sealey and Lindley (1977)). For
credit union i and time period t, the translog cost
function is given by1:
logT˜OCit = αi + β1logF˜it + β2logW˜it
+ β3logQit +
β4
2
(logF˜it)
2 +
β5
2
(logW˜it)
2
+
β6
2
(logQit)
2 + γ1logF˜it · logW˜it
+ γ2logF˜it · logQit + γ3logW˜it · logQit
+ ξ1t+ ξ2t
2 + ξ3tlogQit
Differentiating this with respect to Q and using
the estimated coefficients from the OLS regres-
sion give the marginal costs of credit union i and
time period t,MCit. The output price Pit is given
by the fraction of Total Income over Total Assets.
Results
From this the estimates for the Lerner indices for
each credit union i and time period t are deduced:
LIit =
Pit −MCit
Pit
After excluding extreme outliers of the estimated
values by using the winsorizing technique, the re-
sulting values of the Lerner indices for the U.S.
credit unions are obtained.
St. Dev. 0.11
Mean 0.37600
Min 0.08245
25% Quantile 0.30350
Median 0.37500
75% Quantile 0.44810
Max 0.65130
On average the degree of (monopoly) market
power of a U.S. credit union is given by 0.376
with a standard deviation of 0.11. This result
corresponds to a relatively high degree of market
power and a relatively monopolistic behavior of
credit unions. Moreover, the theoretical analysis
has shown that the Lerner index in the context of
credit unions is underestimating the actual degree
of market power. Therefore, the actual degree of
1All variables with a tilde are variables which normalized with the price of fixed assets R in order to make sure that linear homo-
geneity in the input prices still holds as in Shaffer and Spierdijk (2013)
market power is expected to be even higher than
0.376. We can conclude that the average degree
of market power is considerably higher for U.S.
credit unions than for U.S. commercial banks.
CONCLUSION
This paper investigates the theoretical implica-
tions of a change in the behavioral assumptions
of the Lerner index. Credit unions are assumed to
operate under revenue-maximizing behavior un-
der a minimum profit constraint contrary to the
paradigm of profit-maximizing behavior which
applies to commercial banks. Despite this change
of axioms and the ambiguity of the expected re-
sulting values, the Lerner index still provides a
suitable measure of the degree of market power
for credit unions. It is found that for U.S. credit
unions the Lerner index is, on average, 0.376
with a standard deviation of 0.11. This result
corresponds to a relatively high degree of market
power, evidencing that credit unions are relatively
monopolistic. However, from the theoretical anal-
ysis it followed that the original Lerner index
under the new behavioral assumptions underes-
timates the true degree of market power. This
shows that, on average, the actual market power
of U.S. credit unions is even higher than 0.376.
However, because of computational complexity
we cannot quantify the size of this underestima-
tion effect. Thus, the original Lerner index is less
accurate under the new behavioral assumption.
It can be argued that the assumption of revenue
maximization in the context of a financial institu-
tion such as the credit union might be unrealistic.
This is because a credit union which is issuing as
much loans as possible under a minimum profit
constraint in order to secure solvency does not
seem to provide credit in a trustworthy way. Con-
ceivably, a different objective function of credit
unions might be formulated in such a way that it
is not constrained. This would result in a more
precise estimation of the actual degree of market
power. Future research could be done on mod-
elling a suitable and more precise objective func-
tion of credit unions which incorporates, presum-
ably, optimizing the members’ return on capital
and minimizing the members’ cost of loans.
ROLE OF THE STUDENT
This paper is a shorter version of the bachelor the-
sis performed by Tobias Vervliet. The topic was
proposed by his supervisor prof. dr. L. Spierdijk.
After some fruitful meetings, he came to an origi-
nal view on the subject, which led to a theoretical
analysis which is inspired by the contributions of
L. Spierdijk. Furthermore, he conducted the em-
pirical analysis and translated the large amount of
data into an empirical model.
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